The literature has shown that an increase in housing wealth, driven by unexpected shocks to house prices, exerts a positive e¤ect on the birthrates of homeowners. According to canonical models, a decrease in housing wealth has a symmetric negative impact on the fertility behavior of households. That is, housing gains and losses of the same size have identical quantitative e¤ects on fertility. In comparison, the reference-dependent preferences in prospect theory suggest that people care more about housing losses than equivalent gains, leading to an asymmetric e¤ect of housing wealth on the fertility decision. We propose a theoretical model where household utility depends on both childbirth and housing wealth.
Introduction
Owner-occupied housing is the most signi…cant form of wealth holding for both young-and middle-aged households in Japan. Using microdata from the Nikkei Radar , which covers households in the Tokyo metropolitan area, Iwaisako (2009) demonstrated that housing wealth accounts for approximately 90 percent of the total wealth of homeowners in their 20s, and about 80 percent for those in their 30s or 40s. 1 Of course, housing wealth ‡uctuates markedly because of variations in house prices as in Figure 1 , which depicts the Japan Real Estate Institute (JREI) Home Price Index based on price changes for repeat sales of secondhand condominiums in the Tokyo metropolitan area from 2004 to 2015.
A voluminous literature has investigated how house price ‡uctuations a¤ect household decisions. In a pioneering study, Case et al. (2005) argued that the housing wealth e¤ect on consumption has become increasingly important, as institutional innovations have made it simpler to extract cash from housing equity. 2 They hypothesized, and duly supported with empirical results, that exogenous changes in house prices are associated with changes in the available housing equity, thereby varying consumption. More recently, Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and Dettling and Kearney (2014) have applied the housing wealth e¤ect to the childbearing choices of households. Using the same logic, they hypothesized that changes in house value imply wealth changes for current homeowners, and that these could consequently a¤ect childbearing decisions. Their empirical results, which used data covering a period of housing boom in the US, suggested that children are normal goods and that an increase in house prices tended to encourage childbearing among homeowners.
Household fertility decisions are an important issue in Japan because the total fertility rate fell to its lowest historical level of just 1.26 in 2005. Since then, the total fertility rate has risen slightly, but in 2015 it was still only 1.45. A recent news article has sounded the alarm that the total fertility rate is headed for a long-term decline as second-generation baby boomers, those born between 1971 and 1974, pass their peak childbearing years. 3 Examining the purported theoretical model suggests that the fertility response to housing wealth changes is indeed larger for losses than gains.
We test this theoretical prediction using longitudinal data on Japanese households. The Japanese housing market provides a unique setting for examining the psychological consequences of housing wealth change. In Japan, it is quite di¢ cult to convert housing wealth into cash because there is only a tiny resale market in Japan for used houses, and the …nancial sector does not generally provide equity loans against property of uncertain value (Mitchell and Piggott 2004) . In this regard, any fertility responses would presumably be smaller if housing wealth in ‡uenced homeowners' decisions only through the budget constraint channel. Our dataset covers the period from 2004 to 2015. As shown in Figure 1 , this period appears to be ideal for examining the supposed asymmetric housing wealth e¤ect because the housing market has experienced both price increases and decreases. These variations in housing wealth are captured by the relative change in self-reported house values, where the house values reported in the previous year serve as the reference level. We measure childbearing choices using a binary variable and estimate a logit model to better understand the relationship between changes in housing wealth and family formation behavior. Through this process, we can examine whether price increases and decreases for speci…c properties have di¤erential e¤ects on individual-level fertility decisions.
We …nd that the fertility responses of homeowners are substantially larger for housing losses than gains. In fact, our estimates indicate that a one million yen reduction in house values decreases the probability of childbirth by approximately 4.6 percent, whereas a one million yen increase in house values leads to an increase in the probability of childbirth by less than 0.1 percent. This suggests that encouraging childbirth through boosting housing markets will entail a di¤erent magnitude of impact, depending on housing price gains and losses.
The theory of childbirth and housing wealth
In this section, we propose a theoretical model to derive empirically testable hypotheses for the fertility responses to changes in housing wealth under reference-dependent preferences.
Reference-dependent preferences are one of the main ideas used in prospect theory, as developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , to explain individual attitudes toward risk. Subsequently, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) applied reference dependence to the analysis of riskless choice. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) suggested the outcomes of ‡uctuations in wealth can be evaluated by a value function that has the following three properties: (P1) the value function is de…ned over gains and losses relative to a reference point (reference dependence); (P2) the value function is more sensitive to losses in wealth relative to the reference point than to gains (loss aversion); (P3) the marginal value of gains or losses diminishes with the size of the gain or loss (diminishing sensitivity). The subsequent literature has attempted to model reference-dependent preferences in economic settings (Barberis 2013) .
For example, Bowman et al. (1999) and K½ oszegi and Rabin (2006) formalized a consumption model incorporating the above characteristics, whereas Farber (2008) and Crawford and Meng (2011) used reference dependence to model the labor supply.
We de…ne B t as the propensity to undergo birth at time t, which is endogenously selected by families dwelling in owner-occupied housing. If families do not have a birth, then B t = 0, whereas if they do, then B t = 1. We treat B t as a continuous variable that ranges from zero to one, because it allows us to di¤erentiate the objective function, as shown below. Therefore, B t represents the probability of childbirth in our context. Let us de…ne U (B t ) as the utility from expecting to have a child and C(B t ) as the cost function. Assume that U 0 (B t ) > 0, U 00 (B t ) < 0, C 0 (B t ) > 0, and C 00 (B t ) = 0. The household surplus from having a child can then be written as
To introduce the impact of housing wealth on utility, assume that the utility function U (B t ) is weighted by a value function that depends on the di¤erence between current housing wealth, W t , and the reference wealth (P1). In this analysis, we assume W t is exogenous for families. We also de…ne the house price in the prior year W t 1 as the reference point. The value function captures that the behavior of family members is a¤ected by changes in value of their housing:
To apply the theory of reference-dependent preferences, the optimal level of B t is then chosen by maximizing the following modi…ed surplus functions:
where ( ) and ( ) represent the value functions. First, we assume that ( ) ( ( )) is continuous, strictly increasing (decreasing), greater than zero, and (0) = (0). The last condition ensures that the value functions take the same positive value at the reference point. Second, we assume that the marginal value of gains or losses decreases with the size of the gain or loss (P3).
That is, ( ) is strictly concave for W t > 0, and ( ) is strictly convex for W t < 0. Third, we assume that 0 ( W t ) < j 0 ( W t )j at the reference point. This assumption re ‡ects that families are more sensitive to losses than gains, resulting in a greater marginal value change for losses (P2).
Let us calculate the …rst-order condition for the above problems:
The optimal probability of childbirth then becomes B t regardless of the gains and losses when we evaluate at W t = W t 1 . Di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition with respect to the changes in housing wealth from the reference point (d( W t ) = dW t dW t 1 , where dW t 1 = 0)
can be written as:
assumption. Then the optimal propensity to have a child is kinked at the reference housing wealth and the marginal propensity with respect to an exogenous change in housing wealth from the reference point is discontinuously higher below the kink than above, from the key assumption of loss aversion, 0 ( W t ) < j 0 ( W t )j. In the following analysis, a dichotomous variable indicating childbirth represents the event of interest. This variable takes a value of one if the respondent family had a new baby in the last 12 months, and zero otherwise. The JHPS also provides information on the value of the home if owned. Similar to Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) and Mizutani (2015) , our housing wealth measure is constructed based on self-reported information in the survey ("How much do you think the house and lot would sell for on today's market? "). In the following analysis, we assume that the reference wealth level is the status quo, that is, the self-reported value in the past. This is a standard assumption in the literature where the reference state corresponds to the decision maker's current endowment (Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Case et al. 2013 ).
One could be skeptical about the use of self-reported house values as a proxy for market values in that the owner's valuation could be inaccurate and include systematic bias toward more optimistic valuations. In fact, Kiel and Zabel (1999) showed that the average owner overstates their own house value by 5.1 percent. Using self-reported house values can pose a 7 problem in our application if the measurement errors in an owner's valuation are correlated with birth behavior. This is possible if there are some omitted variables in our model that are also correlated with self-reported house values. However, Kiel and Zabel (1999) showed that valuation errors are uncorrelated with individual owner's characteristics as well as house and neighborhood attributes. Furthermore, because our housing wealth measure is the change in selfreported values, problems arising from systematic overvaluation, which is constant over time, can be largely mitigated. In fact, several previous studies have shown that owner valuations result in accurate estimates of house price indices, which primarily focus on the di¤erences rather than the levels of house values (Kiel and Zabel 1999; Lovenheim 2011) . As shown later, the changes in self-reported values in our dataset closely align with the changes in market prices.
In addition to these variables, we gather a number of important economic and demographic The original survey included 10,489 households in the …rst wave. Of these, 1,561 households participated in the survey only once (i.e., dropped out in the second wave). As we use lagged information (i.e., household and housing characteristics from the previous wave) in our empirical analysis, we exclude these households, resulting in 8,928 unique households.
As our purpose is to identify the impact of self-reported house values on childbirth, we 6 Women's employment careers are likely to be interrupted by childbirth and infant care, leading to a typical reverse-causality problem. Therefore, for employment status, we specify our dummy variables according to the status prior to the childbirth. In addition, we do not use total household income as it includes mother's income. Nevertheless, even using total household income does not change our main empirical results. 7 The JHPS categorizes a respondent's location of residence across seven regions (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku/Shikoku, and Kyushu) and three city sizes (20 major cities, other smaller cities, and towns/villages). restricted our sample to homeowners who did not move during the survey period. For mover households, changes in self-reported house values cannot be interpreted as real house price changes. Furthermore, house values can increase through additions and/or repairs, even when market prices are stable. We therefore excluded from our sample homeowners who made any additions and/or repairs to their home. This reduced the sample to 3,771 unique households reporting valid self-reported house values across adjacent years.
The sample was further restricted to households with a married woman of childbearing age, i.e., a female respondent aged between 20 and 45 years. This reduced the number of unique households further to 1,005. This reduction is substantial because the JHPS includes both single-person (unmarried) households and the elderly. Finally, restricting the sample to those where all necessary information was available further reduced the number of unique households to 918. Taking each household-year pair as the unit of observation, our estimation is based on a total of 6,666 observations. Table 1 provides selected descriptive statistics for our variables. The childbirth dummy has an average value of approximately 0.04, indicating we have a total of 247 births for our observations during the sample period. One reason for this low value may be that the average age of female respondents is approximately 39 years, as reported in Table 1 , and they already have approximately two children on average. The mean self-reported house value is approximately 23.5 million yen (not shown), which is approximately $214,000 ($1=110 yen). On average, house values decreased by about 0.8 million yen during the sample period. 8 Figure 2 illustrates the average self-reported house values over time. As shown, the average house values increased from 2006 to 2007. Then, house values steadily declined until 2012 where they remained through to 2015. The average self-reported house values in the Tokyo metropolitan area also display the same tendency. However, from 2010 to 2011 and from 2013 to 2014, average self-reported house values increased in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Figure 3 shows the annual percentage changes in the average self-reported house values, which are used in the empirical section, in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Figure 3 also provides the annual percentage changes in the JREI Home Price Index (as of January each year). Although there are some gaps between the two house price measures, there is generally a strong correlation (corr. = 0:798) between them. Table 2 highlights the di¤erences in average characteristics between households that experienced housing gains and those that experienced losses. For simplicity, we categorize households that reported the same house value as the previous year (1,698 observations) as housing wealth gainers. 9 Approximately 60 percent of the observations displayed price increases (including those unchanged). For these, house values increased by approximately 3.8 million yen on average. Excluding households that reported W t = W t 1 , the average price appreciation was 6.7 million yen. The remaining observations experienced price declines. For these, house values decreased by approximately 7.1 million yen on average. In sum, our dataset appears to well cover both housing wealth gainers and losers.
In terms of the other socioeconomic characteristics, these two groups of households are similar in most cases. The notable exception is mother's age at childbearing, where mothers who experienced housing gains are signi…cantly older than those who experienced losses. Our interpretation is as follows. Younger women tend to have purchased their houses more recently than older women. The change in the housing values of younger women then re ‡ects both the change in the value of the building, which is generally negative because of depreciation, and the change in the land value. In contrast, housing value tends to only re ‡ect the change in land value for older women, because they are more likely to have purchased their houses long ago, so the building value is relatively small. In this regard, we tend to observe negative housing price ‡uctuations for younger women. In our benchmark regression model, we carefully control for this age di¤erence.
Econometric model
We adopt a simple logit formulation to model the fertility decision at the individual level. Let us de…ne B irt as an unobserved latent variable measuring the propensity to give birth at time t. The subscripts i and r refer to the individual and region, respectively. Assuming a linear speci…cation, our benchmark model is written as:
is an indicator function that takes a value of one if the event A is true, and zero otherwise, W irt is the change in housing wealth at time t, X irt is a set of other explanatory variables, r and t are region and time …xed e¤ects, and " irt is the error term assuming a logistic distribution. The latent variable determines the observed outcome:
In the following analysis, we mainly focus on short-term wealth growth rates, i.e., W irt (W irt W ir;t 1 ) =W ir;t 1 , but we also consider alternative measures such as the changes in level of wealth or longer-term changes.
Holding all other things constant, the e¤ects of housing wealth on birth propensity can be represented by G and L allowing for asymmetric responses. G represents the e¤ect of a one unit increase in housing gains on the birth propensity. In comparison, as W irt takes negative values for housing losses, L represents the e¤ect of a one unit reduction in housing losses.
Hence, if larger losses reduce the propensity to give birth, L would have a positive sign. Our theoretical model predicts that the fertility responses of homeowners are substantially larger for housing losses than gains, implying that G < L .
We must address several econometric issues when estimating this model. First, there could be confounding factors that drive both fertility behaviors and housing wealth increases. For example, local economic conditions are often responsible for house price changes in the same region. They are also closely associated with future income prospects that in ‡uence fertility behavior. To deal with potential confounding e¤ects, we specify …xed e¤ects by region ( r ) and for the survey year ( t ), as well as …xed e¤ects for city size in all of our estimations. 10 As a robustness check, we also estimate the model controlling for the region-speci…c yearly …xed e¤ects.
Second, the e¤ects of di¤erent housing market conditions at the time of home purchase can potentially bias our estimates. For example, Öst (2012) suggested that institutional factors in the housing market, such as the housing subsidies and tax bene…ts associated with home purchase, can potentially a¤ect subsequent birth behavior. To deal with any underlying heterogeneity in birth behavior, we control for …xed e¤ects for the year in which households moved into the current residence, together with the year of birth. 11
Empirical results
As a preliminary step, we begin by considering a simple model excluding any asymmetric impact of housing wealth on fertility decisions. Speci…cally, we estimate the econometric model with the restriction that G = L . In the following analysis, we present average marginal e¤ects (AMEs) rather than parameter estimates, with robust standard errors calculated using the Delta method. Table 3 presents the empirical results. 12 The results in column [1] show that a short-term increase in house prices is positively associated with the homeowner's probability of giving birth in a given year. This result is consistent with previous …ndings in the literature. The signi…cantly positive sign indicates that during a housing boom (bust), an increase (decrease) in house prices leads to a positive (negative) wealth e¤ect on the fertility decisions of homeowners. However, the marginal e¤ect is rather small (AME = 0:001), possibly because in Japan housing wealth is a less liquid asset. We also present regression results using an alternative speci…cation for the housing wealth measure, i.e., changes in the level of self-reported house values, W irt W ir;t 1 , in column [2] of Table 3 . These results also suggest that short-term increases in house prices are positively associated with the homeowner's probability of giving birth. 13 In terms of the demographic and family background variables, our results are as follows.
Female respondent's age has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on childbirth. 14 The education of the female respondent matters in that respondents with a four-year college or postgraduate degree tend to have a lower probability of giving birth, although estimated marginal e¤ects are not signi…cant at the conventional level. Compared with respondents not working, the probability of giving birth is considerably lower for those working part time (in year t 1). The husband's labor income also matters, being signi…cantly and positively associated with childbirth.
Given these preliminary results, we now test the asymmetric impact of housing wealth on the fertility decision. The results are in columns [3] and [4] of Table 3 . The null hypothesis of equal wealth e¤ects, H 0 : G = L , is tested against the one-sided alternative H a : G < L (in terms of the average marginal e¤ects). From column [3], we …nd that L is signi…cantly positive (AME = 0:040), while G is considerably smaller and statistically insigni…cant (AME = 0:001). That is, a decrease in housing wealth is associated with a greater decrease in fertility than an equivalent wealth increase with an increase in fertility. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction that the fertility responses of homeowners are substantially larger for housing losses than gains.
As a result, the null hypothesis of equal wealth e¤ects, H 0 : G = L , is strongly rejected. The results in column [4] using annual changes in the level of house values yield qualitatively similar …ndings.
To evaluate the results in column [3] quantitatively, we calculate the e¤ect of a one million yen change in house prices on the birth probability. Given the average house value in our dataset is 23.5 million yen (approximately $214,000), a one million yen change translates into a relative house value change of 0.043. Our empirical results in column [3] suggest that households facing a one million yen decrease in their house values were approximately 0.17 percentage points less likely to have an additional birth in the following year (= 0:040 0:043). This seems to be quite small, but given that the average value of our dependent variable (childbirth dummy) is 0.037, it means that birth probability would decrease by about 4.6 percent (= 0:17=3:7). A similar exercise shows that households facing a one million yen increase in their house values would 1 4 As shown in Table 2 , women experiencing housing gains are signi…cantly older than those su¤ering losses. To see whether this would bias our estimates, we estimated an alternative model that better controls for the age e¤ects, including quadratic age terms or age dummies. These alternative speci…cations, however, did not change our main results. 13 increase their birth probability by less than 0.1 percent.
As noted earlier, unlike the US, home equity loans in Japan are virtually nonexistent. This ensures short-term housing wealth changes are not easily convertible into liquid funds. As a result, the impact of housing wealth on fertility in column [1] is quite small (AME = 0:001).
However, in column [3], the impact barely lessens when W irt 0 (AME = 0:001, but insignificant), while the impact is substantially strengthened when W irt < 0 (AME = 0:040). The empirical …ndings of this section thus appear to imply that loss aversion and reference dependence play an important role in determining the asymmetric impact of short-term housing gains and losses on fertility.
Robustness checks
The remainder of this section reports the results of additional speci…cations to assess the robustness of our main …ndings. We estimate alternative models in addition to our benchmark model and summarize the results in Table 4 . In column [1], we use house value changes for the past three years, (W irt W ir;t 3 ) =W ir;t 3 , as an alternative wealth measure. This enables us to examine the longer-term e¤ects of housing wealth changes on childbirth. While not shown in the table, when we estimate the econometric model using longer-term housing appreciation with the restriction that G = L , the marginal e¤ect (AME = 0:005) is larger than the short-term e¤ect in column [1] of Table 3 (AME = 0:001). Compared with AME = 0:005, the results in column [1] of Table 4 suggest that housing gains over the past three years appear to have a slightly smaller, but signi…cant, wealth impact on fertility (AME = 0:004). Conversely, the marginal e¤ect for housing losses becomes somewhat larger (AME = 0:009). However, the difference in AMEs for gains and losses turns out to be substantially smaller than that in our benchmark results for short-term wealth changes (column [3] of Table 3 ). This is primarily due to the fact that long-term housing losses (AME = 0:009) appear to have smaller impact than short-term losses (AME = 0:040). Our interpretation for the smaller di¤erence in longer-term housing losses is as follows. The benchmark results in Table 3 suggest that loss aversion and reference dependence generate a relatively large impact of short-term housing losses on fertility.
However, the short-term impact of housing losses due to homeowners'regret (or loss aversion) may dissipate over time. In sum, we suspect that a symmetric housing wealth e¤ect via the equity extraction channel increases its in ‡uence, while the in ‡uence of the asymmetric housing wealth e¤ect through the channel of loss aversion and reference dependence decreases when we consider longer-term changes in housing value. As a result, the degree of asymmetry becomes weaker for the longer-term wealth changes, and the di¤erences between the marginal e¤ects of housing gains and losses are not statistically signi…cant at any conventional level. 15 As we assume that the reference wealth level coincides with the status quo (W ir;t 1 ), any measurement errors in past house values can bias our results. Measurement error in past house values presumably poses a serious problem if current housing wealth is not very di¤erent from the reference wealth level (i.e., W ir;t W ir;t 1 ). This is because only a small amount of measurement error in past house values can change whether a particular household has housing wealth above (or below) the reference level. Therefore, in column [2] of Table 4 , we exclude households reporting the same self-reported house values in adjacent years, i.e., W irt = W ir;t 1 . Because 1,698 households report the same house values in adjacent years, this substantially reduces our sample size. Nevertheless, the estimated results in column [2] are qualitatively similar to our benchmark results. Further, while the estimated marginal e¤ect on housing losses is somewhat larger than our benchmark result, we continue to observe an asymmetric wealth e¤ect. We therefore believe that measurement errors do not pose serious problems in our estimation. Table 4 , we estimate the same model using the sample of households that already had at least one child (i.e., second and subsequent births) to examine whether homeowners' fertility responses di¤er for …rst and subsequent births. The impact of housing gains turns out to be larger and more signi…cant, while that of housing losses become smaller, than in our benchmark result. Nonetheless, the null hypothesis of equal wealth e¤ects is rejected, indicating that the fertility responses of homeowners are larger for housing losses than gains.
In column [3] of
While fertility responses for …rst births may be interpreted as changes in the optimal timing of 1 5 The interpretation here is also supported by our additional empirical results. Following Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) , we also estimate the model including both the one-year housing wealth changes, (Wirt Wir;t 1) =Wir;t 1, and the lagged two-year changes, (Wir;t 1 Wir;t 3) =Wir;t 3. The results indicate that long-term gains and losses have a signi…cant impact on fertility. However, even after controlling for the longer-term e¤ects, the impact of housing wealth changes appears to be strongest for short-term losses. In addition, we still …nd that there is an asymmetry in the impact of short-term gains and losses. childbirth, those for second and subsequent births may represent changes in the total number of children. Therefore, our results suggest that housing wealth a¤ects not only the timing of childbirth, but also the total number of children. 16 As discussed earlier, one potential threat to identi…cation is the presence of confounding factors. To consider this issue, we estimate a model that includes region-speci…c year e¤ects (i.e., controlling for the interaction terms between region and the yearly …xed e¤ects). This allows us to better control for the potentially confounding factors that could a¤ect both housing wealth changes and the fertility decision. As shown in column [4] of Table 4 , this alternative speci…cation yields the same results as our benchmark case, thereby providing some con…dence that our main empirical …ndings are not unduly in ‡uenced by potential confounding factors such as regional macroeconomic conditions.
In Table 5 , we present several alternative models allowing for more ‡exible speci…cations of housing gains/losses. In column [1], we added a dummy variable indicating whether respondents experienced housing gains. Our theoretical model assumes that the value function is continuous at the reference point. Consistent with this assumption, the additional dummy variable has a statistically insigni…cant e¤ect on childbirth. In addition, the coe¢ cient estimates for changes in self-reported house values are quantitatively similar to our benchmark results in column [3] of Table 3 . Table 5 , we adopt a quadratic speci…cation for housing wealth changes. This is useful for testing whether the asymmetric housing wealth responses in the benchmark results are driven by the potential nonlinearity of the housing wealth e¤ect. We initially included quadratic terms for both housing gains and losses, and found that quadratic speci…cation is appropriate only for housing gains. As a result, we adopt a quadratic speci…cation for housing gains, and a linear speci…cation for losses. The estimated marginal e¤ect for housing gains becomes signi…cant and considerably larger than that observed in our benchmark model. 17 Nonetheless, it is still found that the fertility responses are asymmetric in terms of housing gains and losses.
In column [2] of
That is, housing losses have a greater impact on fertility than do gains of an equivalent size.
As discussed earlier, our benchmark model for homeowners could be biased because of the presence of confounding factors that drive both fertility behavior and housing wealth increases.
For example, local economic conditions are often responsible for house price changes in the region. They are also closely associated with future income prospects that in turn in ‡uence fertility behavior. If our benchmark model is subject to bias stemming from confounding local economic conditions, then our housing wealth variable also positively in ‡uences the fertility decisions of prospective owners (i.e., renters), as suggested by the literature. To examine the e¤ects of housing price changes on renters, we derive year-on-year changes in regional house prices. Regional house price changes are obtained using the following procedure. We …rst regress the log of homeowner's self-reported values on a set of housing characteristics and year dummies. The estimation results for the house value regression imposing an AR(1) process are presented in Table 6 . We then average the residuals for each city across time to obtain the quality-adjusted log price levels. Taking the …rst di¤erence of the log price levels yields
year-on-year changes in house price levels at the city level. Table 7 provides our estimation results using regional house price changes. The …rst two columns present the regression results for homeowners. These results are presented to discern the validity of our regional house price changes. In column [1], we can see that changes in regional house values have a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on childbirth. In addition, allowing for an asymmetric e¤ect, as in column [2], we can see that changes in regional house values have a signi…cantly positive marginal e¤ect estimate only when regional house values decrease.
The regression results for renter households are in columns [3] and [4] of Table 7. Regional house price changes have a negative, although not statistically signi…cant, impact on renter fertility decisions (Lovenheim and Mumford 2013) . As a result, our empirical results for renters suggest that our housing wealth variable does not proxy for local economic conditions that may potentially a¤ect both housing prices and fertility decisions. The negative sign may re ‡ect the fact that an increase in house prices will have the opposite e¤ect on renters, as this will require a larger deposit for future home purchases and reduce the available resources for these households to have a child.
If renters are also loss averse, a negative fertility response can be larger in absolute terms for price increases than decreases. House price increases can represent a "loss" for renters as this leads renters to spend more to purchase otherwise equivalent homes. We thus expect that j G j > j L j, which yields an opposite inequality to that for homeowners. Column [4] in Table 7 , produced by allowing for the asymmetric impact of regional house price increases and decreases, indeed demonstrates that AME is j 0:083j when W irt 0, while it is j 0:032j when W irt < 0, thereby suggesting that renters are also loss averse. Nonetheless, the estimated marginal e¤ect is not signi…cant, even for price increases. As a result, the null hypothesis of equal wealth e¤ects, H 0 : G = L , cannot be rejected for renters. This suggests that the asymmetric housing wealth e¤ects are more salient for homeowners than renters. Asymmetry can be larger for homeowners than renters as experimental tests by Kahneman et al. (1990) suggested that the reluctance for homeowners to sell their property at a loss can exceed the reluctance of renters to purchase homes at higher prices. In this case, we expect that the estimates of price increases for renters may not be as strong as those for price decreases for homeowners, and may therefore indicate that the degree of asymmetry becomes weaker for renters. Taken together, these explanations account for the lack of a clear asymmetry in the renter estimates.
Conclusion
This paper estimated the responses of homeowner childbirth to changes in housing wealth using recent longitudinal data on Japanese households. The main contribution of our analysis is to highlight the role of reference-dependent preferences, as assumed by prospect theory, in explaining household fertility decisions and their relationship with changes in housing wealth.
Consistent with previous …ndings in the literature, we found that the propensity to have a child is positively associated with a one-year housing wealth change. However, our empirical speci…cations, which allow for the asymmetric impact of housing gains and losses on childbirth, supported our arguments that the fertility responses of homeowners are substantially larger for losses than gains, at least in the short run. The empirical results demonstrated that homeowners facing a one million yen decrease in house values from the previous year were approximately 4.6 percent less likely to have an additional birth in the following year, while an equivalent increase in house values had only a negligible impact on childbirth. This is consistent with our theoretical model that predicts disproportionately higher wealth e¤ects on childbirth when housing prices fall below some reference level. The empirical …ndings were robust with respect to alternative speci…cations.
We do not intend to argue against other reasons explaining the evidence presented here.
First, in some countries, there is the asymmetric tax treatment of losses and gains in owneroccupied housing. Such an institutional arrangement might in ‡uence di¤erently the budget constraints of homeowners with housing gains or losses. For example, throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, many Japanese homeowners experienced negative housing equity because the loss in housing value was substantial. To address this problem, the government revised the tax system in 2004 such that households could deduct capital losses on property held for personal use. Seko and Sumita (2007) focused on the 2004 tax revisions and found that they increased home replacement, especially for households with a high loan-to-value ratio. In our context, the 2004 tax revisions may impact on the budget constraint only when homeowners realize a loss on their house. Accordingly, housing wealth has an asymmetric impact on childbirth. However, to capture this impact, the reference wealth level must be the purchase price rather than the price in the previous year, because capital gains and losses are based on the purchase price. We therefore use the house price in the prior year as the reference wealth level.
Second, our estimates might be subject to the inherently asymmetric nature of fertility decisions. While the decision to postpone childbearing can be almost certainly successful, the decision to have a baby is not always successful given some biological constraints. As a result, housing losses might reduce the propensity for childbearing to a greater extent than gains would increase the propensity. One way to examine whether biological constraints play a key role in explaining asymmetric responses is to estimate our model using the subsample of women who are less likely to face biological constraints. In column [3] of Table 4 , we presented empirical results for women with at least one child. As these women have been pregnant at least once before, they are less likely to face biological constraints (controlling for age and the set of demographic characteristics). The asymmetric impact still remained, though the degree of asymmetry weakened compared with the benchmark results. We also estimated a model for the subsample of relatively young women, because it is more di¢ cult for a woman to become pregnant as she becomes older (results not shown). Likewise, the empirical results demonstrated the asymmetric impact signi…cantly, but the degree of asymmetry lessened in comparison with benchmark results.
Instead of these two explanations, the asymmetric housing wealth e¤ect on childbirth affected by loss aversion and reference dependence may be an additional explanation (Genesove and Mayer 2001; Case et al. 2013) . In fact, Nakagawa and Saito (2012) have suggested that the Japanese tend to behave as expected by prospect theory using survey data that questioned apartment residents in the Tokyo metropolitan area on their preferred investment plan for mitigating earthquake risk.
It is useful to consider the policy implications of this paper. To increase the fertility rate of homeowners, the government may attempt to raise house values. However, our empirical evidence regarding the asymmetric housing wealth e¤ect indicates that this kind of policy may be valid only when housing prices have a downward trend. That is, such policy may not dramatically improve the fertility rates of homeowners during a boom phase, because housing wealth has such a small impact on childbirth during this time.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1991) . Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061.
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Source: Japan Real Estate Institute Notes: † denotes a dummy variable. The null hypothesis is tested using two-sample -tests assuming unequal variances against the alternative of , where and are the relevant mean pairs of gains and losses. *** , ** , and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. year, birth cohort, and the year moved into current residence included but results not shown see Table 8 in the Appendix .
The null hypothesis of is tested using one-sided Wald tests against the alternative of . The test statistics have a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Notes: House value specification is growth rate. Average marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. Years since most recent childbirth, dummy variables for the number of existing children, region, city size, survey year, birth cohort, and the year moved into current residence included but results not shown. Predicted regional house value changes for each year and city are from estimation results in Table 6 . Estimation sample is existing homeowners for results in models 1 and 2 , and renters for results in models 3 and 4 . The null hypothesis of is tested using one-sided Wald tests against the alternative of . The test statistics have a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Appendix Table 8 .A: Benchmark results for logit estimates Table 3 continued  1  2  3  4  Rate  Difference  Rate  Difference  No. of existing children ref: no children  One child -0.190 *** -0.192 *** -0.196 *** -0.199 *** 0.049 0.049 0.051 0.052 Two children -0.241 *** -0.243 *** -0.246 *** -0.249 *** 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.052 Three or more children -0.250 *** -0.252 *** -0.255 *** -0.258 *** 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.050 Years since most recent childbirth -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Region ref: Hokkaido Tohoku -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.009 -0.008 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 Kanto 0.005 * 0.005 * 0.004 0.006 ** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 Chubu -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 Kinki 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 Chugoku/Shikoku 0.017 *** 0.017 *** 0.017 *** 0.018 *** 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 Kyushu -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 City size ref: major city Small city -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 Town/village -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 Table 3 . *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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